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Muzzling Corporations: The Court Giveth and the Court
Taketh Away a Corporation's "Fundamental Right" to
Free Political Speech in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1985, the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
placed an advertisement in a Michigan newspaper to persuade voters in
the state's 93rd House district to support its favored candidate, Richard
Bandstra, in a special election to fill a vacancy in the Michigan State
House of Representatives.' Like the thousands of similar ads that are
placed every year in support of candidates for political office throughout
the nation, the Chamber's ad discussed the issues that the Chamber felt
were important to the voters and explained why Bandstra was the
Chamber's choice for the job. 2
On March 27, 1990, the United States Supreme Court declared the
mere placing of the advertisement to be a felony, upholding a Michigan
statute banning political campaign ads paid for by corporations. 3
The case arose when the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
decided to place the ad in direct violation of the Michigan Campaign
Finance Act in order to challenge a provision of the act that outlawed
contributions by corporations to political campaigns. The statute also
forbade "independent expenditures ' 4 by corporations on behalf of de-
clared candidates for public office in Michigan,' making the expenditure
Copyright 1991. by LOUISIANA LAw RBVYEW.
i. For the full text of the advertisement, see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1427 (1990).
2. Id.
3. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
4. An independent expenditure is one that is "not made at the direction of, or
under the control of, another person," especially the campaign itself. Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 169.209 (West 1989). See infra discussion in text accompanying note 18.
5. Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.254 (West 1989).
The act also outlawed direct contributions by corporations to political campaigns, but
since the Chamber's advertisement was an independent expenditure, the contribution issue
was not before the Court. For the difference between contributions and independent
expenditures, see infra text accompanying note 18.
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of such funds a felony.6 The Chamber sued for injunctive relief to
prevent the enforcement of the statute.'
The Chamber is a non-profit corporation, comprised of over 8,000
members, three-fourths of which are for-profit corporations. The general
treasury of the Chamber was funded through annual dues required of
all members.' Although the Chamber had established a "segregated
fund" and could have complied with the statute by using this fund to
pay for its political advertisement, the Chamber chose to use its general
treasury to pay for the ad in order to challenge the statute.
The Chamber argued that the prohibition on expenditures from the
corporation's general treasury violated the corporation's First Amend-
ment right to free speech by effectively banning political speech by the
corporation. Secondly, the Chamber argued that the ban on independent
expenditures by corporations, but not by labor unions, violated the
Chamber's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection right to be treated
equally to similarly situated entities. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan upheld the statute, 9 but the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding, in part, that the
statute could not be applied to the Chamber without violating the
corporation's First Amendment rights. 0 The United States Supreme Court,
while acknowledging that the corporation has a fundamental First
Amendment right to free speech," reversed and upheld the statute. By
a six to three voie,12 the Court held that the statute violated neither
6. The statutory penalty for violating the statute is a "fine of not more than $5,000.00
or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both, or if the person is not an
individual, by a fine of not more than $10,000.00." Since the Chamber is a juridical
"person," not an individual, the maximum fine upon conviction was $10,000.
7. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396. The Chamber was a non-profit corporation, comprised
of over 8,000 members, three-fourths of which were for-profit corporations. The general
treasury of the Chamber was funded through annual dues required of all members. Austin,
110 S. Ct. at 1395. Although the Chamber had established a "segregated fund" and
could have complied with the statute by using this fund to pay for its political adver-
tisement, the Chamber chose to use its general treasury to pay for the ad, in order to
challenge the statute.
8. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1395.
9. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Mich.
1986).
10. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988).
II. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1990).
("The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its speech from the
ambit of the First Amendment.") The Court derives this acknowledgment of the cor-
poration's right to free speech from First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (1978).
12. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan (who filed a concurring opinion), White, Blackmun, and
Stevens. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and O'Connor dissented.
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the corporation's First Amendment nor Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution. It is the First Amendment claim
that received the lion's share of the Court's attention in the majority
opinion in Austin, and which will be the subject of this note.
II. PURPOSE Op Tis NoTE
In Austin, the Court did not decide to overrule prior cases in which
it held that a corporation has a fundamental right to free political
speech. Instead, it stated that it was leaving that "fundamental right"
intact; yet for all practical purposes, the court rendered the right devoid
of any real meaning. Under prior jurisprudence, the designation of a
right as "fundamental" has meant that any state action infringing upon
the right must be justified by a compelling state interest in regulating
the activity, and must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest.
In Austin, the Court diminished the value of the fundamental right
designation by stretching the definition of a "compelling state interest"
so far that the right is very easy to circumvent for a state that wishes
to regulate "free" political speech.
This note will examine the Court's troublesome insistence that it is
following the precedent that acknowledged the fundamental right of
corporations to engage in political speech. It will be shown that the
Court did not give full deference to that right. Instead; the Court allowed
the right to be overcome by a "compelling" interest so weak that the
"fundamental right" is not really being honored at all. By accepting a
less-than-compelling state interest as sufficient to allow a state to regulate
a fundamental right in Austin, the Court may have weakened other
fundamental rights that are currently protected by the "compelling state
interest" requirement.
III. AUSTIN v. MicHmoAzi CHAMER OF COMMERCE
A. The Facts
In order to challenge the statutory ban on independent expenditures
made by corporations on behalf of political campaigns, the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce placed a newspaper advertisement supporting
Richard Bandstra in a special election to fill a seat in the state House
of Representatives. 3 The Chamber then sued for injunctive relief to
prevent the enforcement of the section of the Michigan Campaign Fi-
nance Act that made the placement of such an ad punishable as a
felony.
13. For the full text of the advertisement. see Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1427.
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B. The Statute: The Michigan Campaign Finance Act
The Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1976 sets the rules for
funding campaigns for public office in the state of Michigan." Section
254 of the statute makes it a felony for a corporation to "make a
contribution or [independent) expenditure or provide volunteer personal
services" to campaigns of declared candidates for public office.15 The
proscription extends to all corporations, whether incorporated in Mi-
chigan or in any other state or foreign country, with an exception for
corporations formed for political purposes.16 The spending ban applies
to campaigns of political candidates only; it does not apply to efforts
to qualify, pass, or defeat a referendum.' 7
The Austin case involved independent expenditures to show support
for a political candidate. Independent expenditures are made by an
outside party not related to the campaign-in this case the Chamber of
Commerce-in order to convince the public to support the election of
a candidate. Unlike a campaign contribution, the independent expenditure
is made directly by the outside party without consultation with the
campaign, typically by the purchase of a newspaper ad or the printing
of buttons or bumper stickers bearing the candidate's name. In this
case, the Chamber placed the advertisement directly with newspapers,
paying for the production and placement of the ad and controlling its
content and design.'"
The Michigan legislature included a provision allowing the corpo-
ration to set up a "segregated fund" which is separate and distinct
from the corporation's general treasury that contains the funds the
14. Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 169.201-169.282
(West 1989). The Michigan statute was based on Section 441b of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1990). The Michigan statute applies to elections for
state and local offices in Michigan- elections for federal offices are covered by the federal
statute.
15. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.254(1) (West 1989). Section 169.204 (West 1989)
describes which volunteer services constitute campaign contributions. It is illegal for
corporations to provide these services.
16. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.254(2) (West 1989).
17. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.254(3) (West 1989). There are, however, some
limits on the ban. The statute makes an exception 'for "loans made in the ordinary course
of business" so that lending institutions and creditors extending credit to political campaigns
would not be guilty of a felony. (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.254(1) (West 1989)).
Two types of corporations are excepted from the proscription entirely: corporations formed
expressly for political purposes-commonly known as "political action committees" or
PACs-and media corporations, such as television stations and newspapers.
18. The disclaimer at the bottom of the advertisement read: "Not authorized by the
Candidate Committee of Richard Bandstra. Paid for by the Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, Suite 400, 300 Washington Square, Lansing, Michigan 40833." Austin, 110
S. Ct. at 1427.
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corporation accrues from conducting its business. This was an attempt
to insulate the statute from a finding that it violates a corporation's
First Amendment rights by banning corporate political speech. 19 The
segregated fund could make political expenditures from its own resources,
but the corporation's general fund could not be spent on campaign
contributions or independent expenditures,"O and the corporation itself
would not be allowed to contribute to the segregated fund.2'1 Instead,
the statute limits who can contribute to the segregated fund, with one
set of eligible contributors for segregated funds of for-profit corporations
and another set for non-profit corporations. The segregated fund of a
for-profit corporation is limited to soliciting contributions from stock-
holders,'officers and directors of the corporation, as well as "[e]mployees
of the corporation who have policy making, managerial, professional,
supervisory, or administrative nonclerical responsibilities. '"2
In the case of the Chamber, a non-profit corporation, the segregated
fund can receive contributions from the same sources as for-profit
corporations, and may also solicit contributions from members of the
Chamber who are individuals, stockholders of the Chamber's members,
officers or directors of the Chamber's members, and employees of the
Chamber's members who have key policy making or supervisory positions
in their respective organizations. 2 By limiting member contributions to
members who are individuals, the statute eliminates from contributions
virtually the entire Chamber membership, which is made up predomi-
nantly of corporations.
At the heart of the statute is the prohibition on spending from the
general treasury. By not permitting the corporation to fund its speech
through its general fund and by also barring the corporation from
contributing to the segregated fund, the statute is not a "limitation"
on the corporation's speech in state elections, but an outright ban.
C. The Issue in Austin
The first amendment issue in Austin was whether the Michigan
statute was narrowly tailored to address a state interest that was suf-
ficiently compelling to justify the restriction of the Chamber's funda-
19. For the Supreme Court precedent recognizing a corporation's right of free political
speech, see infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
20. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255 (West 1989).
21. The corporation itself, via a general treasury is not on the narrow list of individuals
and entities which may contribute to the fund, as set out in Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
169.255(2) (West 1989) (for segregated funds of for-profit corporations) nor in Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255(3) (West 1989) (for segregated funds of non-profit corpo-
rations).
22. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255(2) (West 1989).
23. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255(3) (West 1989).
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mental right to free political speech. In other words, was the perceived
evil engendered by the spending of money by corporations on political
speech sufficiently dire that the state was justified in banning the speech?
Prior to Austin, the closest the Court had come to deciding the
constitutionality of restricting corporate speech to segregated funds was
the ruling in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life,4 in which the Court struck down the segregated fund restriction
in the Federal Election Campaign Act (on which the Michigan statute
in Austin was based) as it applied to a pro-life group in Massachusetts.
However, the Massachusetts Citizens for Life ruling was not controlling
in Austin because the Court noted that the corporation in Massachusetts
Citizens for Ljfe (unlike the Chamber of Commerce in Austin) was
formed specifically for political purposes, making the group "more akin
to voluntary political associations than business firms.' ' Contributors
to the corporation knew that their money would be used for the political
purpose of the corporation, unlike a business corporation in which the
shareholder contributes for the purpose of making a profit, but may
disagree with the corporation's political views.
2 6
To understand the first amendment issue as it applies to Austin,
two related questions must be answered: first, does a ban on political
spending by a speaker necessarily infringe upon that speaker's right to
political speech, and second, are corporations among these entities that
are afforded a fundamental right of free political speech under the First
Amendment? Prior United States Supreme Court cases answered both
questions in the affirmative.
In Buckley v. Valeo ' the Court acknowledged that in the modern
environment of political speech that is generated predominately through
expensive mass mailing campaigns and saturation television advertising,
the freedom to expend large quantities of money is an integral component
of political speech. As the Court stated in Buckley:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires. the ex-
penditure of money.
2s
24. 479 U.S. 238, 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
25. Id. at 263, 107 S. Ct. at 631.
26. Id. at 260-61, 107 S. Ct. at 629.
27. 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
28. Id. at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 634-35.
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The majority in Austin conceded that "[c]ertainly, the use of funds
to support a political candidate is 'speech'; independent campaign ex-
penditures constitute 'political expression' at the core of our electoral
process and of the first amendment freedoms." 2 9
The question of whether corporations are included in the First
amendment's guarantee of free speech has also been previously decided
by the Court. At the beginning of the Austin opinion, the Court ac-
knowledged its precedent recognizing a fundamental right of corporations
to engage in political speech, which can only be abridged upon the
showing by the state that its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interestA0
It was in First National Bank of Boston v. BellottPl that the Court
ruled that first amendment rights apply not only to individuals, but to
corporations as well. The Bellotti court rejected the "proposition that
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amend-
ment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation. '3 2
The Court noted that the need to protect political speech "is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an in-
dividual."" The Court stressed that it is not only the speaker's right
to engage in speech that is protected by the First Amendment, but
society's need to hear all points of view. "IT]he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw."34
The Court has stated, in Federal Election Commission v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life," that requiring a corporation to make its
speech through a.segregated fund rather than through its general treasury
burdens the corporation's right to free political speech. The fact that
"the corporation is not free to use its general funds for campaign
advocacy purposes" burdens the corporation's speech.36 A finding that
29. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1990), quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 96 S. Ct. at 644, which in turn quoted Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 32, 89 S. Ct. 5, 11 (1968).
30. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396. The "compelling state interest" requirement dates
back to the 1963 case of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S. Ct. 328, 341
(1963), in which the Court declared that "only a compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms." Since Button, the Court has come to accept that corporations
as well as individuals have a fundamental right to free speech that can only be abridged
upon the showing that the state action meets the Button compelling state interest test.
31. 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978).
32. Bellotti, id. at 784, 98 S. Ct. at 1420.
33. Id. at 777, 98 S. Ct. at 1416.
34. Id. at 783, 98 S. Ct. at 1419.
35. 479 U.S. 238, 252, 107 S. Ct. 616, 624 (1986).
36. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 624.
1991]
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an action "burdens" speech is independent of determining whether the
burden is permissible or not; instead, finding that an action burdens
speech is just another way for the Court to say that the action affects
a fundamental right and must therefore meet the compelling state interest
test. By finding such a burden in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the
Court was acknowledging that the state action affected the corporation's
fundamental right to free political speech.
The ban on spending from the corporation's general treasury and
the required use of a segregated fund also appears to conflict with the
Court's pronouncement in Meyer v. Grant that "Itihe First Amendment
protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause but also to
select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing."
'
"1
All of this must be understood in the light of the Court's general
ban on restricting speech based on the identity of the speaker: in this
case, restrictions based on the fact that the speaker is a corporation.
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely,3 the Court struck down
a statute that prohibited non-union picketers near certain buildings, while
allowing unions to picket the same areas, because the classification was
based solely on who was doing the picketing. In the Michigan statute
at issue in Austin, the same principle applies; corporations are banned
from speaking solely because of their identity as corporations. Every
other individual and entity in the state is allowed to spend money to
publicly debate elections except for corporations. In Bellotti, the Court
held that "[i]n the realm of protected speech, the legislature is consti-
tutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue." 9
As a result of these precedents, the Austin Court was required to
justify its upholding of the Michigan statute's ban on corporate political
speech by showing that the state's action was narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest in regulating the speech.
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION IN AusTiN
In Austin, the Supreme Court upheld the Michigan Campaign Fi-
nance Act, allowing the ban on corporate independent expenditures in
political election campaigns to stand. The Court acknowledged that
corporations like the Chamber have a fundamental right to engage in
political speech, but found that the state had a compelling state interest
that justified the infringement of that right. Rather than finding a single
compelling interest, the Court asserted two interests that had, taken
37. 486 U.S. 414, 424, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (1988).
38. 408 U.S. 92, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972).
39. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85, 98 S. Ct. 1407,
1420 (1978).
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individually, been rejected in previous cases as insufficiently compelling
and offered them together as a compelling interest.40 These interests are:
first, the fact that corporations acquire their wealth with the help of
the "special advantages"' state corporation law confers upon the cor-
poration, and second, the possibility that political expenditures by cor-
porations will cause "corruption" of the electoral process. 42 As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the majority "seeks to create one good
argument by combining two bad ones." '43
A. "Special Advantages"
By organizing under the state's corporation laws, the corporation
receives certain "special advantages" that enable it to do business and
facilitate the accumulation of wealth under the corporate form. Among
these advantages are limited personal liability of the corporation's stock-
holders, perpetual existence of the corporation, and "favorable treatment
of the accumulation and distribution of assets.""4 The Court reasoned
that since these advantages allow the corporation to acquire assets-
including the money it spends on political speech-the state has a com-
pelling interest in counterbalancing any unfair advantage the corporation
may gain over other speakers who do not have similar state-conferred
assistance in raising money for political speech. Quoting Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court reasoned that
by using the advantages of corporate status to advance its political ideas,
the corporation is using "'resources amassed in the economic market-
place' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. ' 4
B. "Corruption"
The Supreme Court had previously held in Buckley v. Valeo"s and
Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC) that the state's interest in controlling corruption
or the appearance of corruption was the only "legitimate and compelling
government interest[s]" that would justify a state's regulation of political
spending.47 But in Buckley, the court also explicitly concluded that
40. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1409 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
41. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
42. Id.
43. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
45. Id., quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238, 257, 107 S. Ct. 616, 627 (1986).
46. 424 U.S. I, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
47. Federal Election Commission v. Nat. Conserv. Pol. Action, 470 U.S. 480, 496-
97, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1468 (1985).
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independent expenditures do not pose the threat of such corruption .4
Realizing the difficulty it would have reconciling Buckley with a finding
for the state in Austin, the Court decided to circumvent Buckley by
drawing up a new definition of corruption. The traditional definition
of corruption was reiterated in NCPAC:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected of-
ficials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the
financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors .4
Rather than using this standard quid pro quo definition of corrup-
tion, and conceding that corporate independent expenditures do not
corrupt the system according to the Court's own definition, the Court
crafted a new, amorphous definition of corruption malleable enough to
include independent expenditures: any speech that has "the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are ac-
cumulated with the help of the corporate form and have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." 50
This, the Court acknowledged, is a "different type of corruption" from
the generally understood meaning of the word.5'
The Court also went one step further. The Court ruled that the
ban on political expenditures by corporations could be constitutionally
applied to corporations that are not large or wealthy enough to cause
the feared "distortion" of the political process. The Court ruled that
the "potential" for corruption inherent in the corporate form would
allow Michigan to ban contributions from even small or non-profit
corporations that are not capable of actually causing the Court's version
of "corruption. 5 s2
V. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of "Special Advantages" Reasoning
The Court's "special advantages" reasoning is unsatisfying because
it is circular. In short, the Court reasoned that a corporation's ac-
knowledged fundamental right to free political speech may be infringed
because a corporation receives certain advantages over the speakers
because it amasses its wealth with the assistance of state corporation
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46, 96 S. Ct. at 647-48.
49. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497, 105 S. Ct. at 1468.
50. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1398. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 73-79.
[Vol. 52
NOTES
law. In the Court's previous decisions in which it accepted the funda-
mental right of corporations to engage in political speech, the Court
clearly took into account the fact that the speaker is organized as a
corporation under state law, with any "special advantages" that such
incorporation might entail. Since the whole point of incorporating is to
gain the benefit of these special advantages, the Court certainly knew
when it accepted the fundamental right that every corporation seeking
to assert the right had received the benefit of these advantages. Yet,
the majority used these same special advantages as a justification for
circumventing the very right it just acknowledged. In other words, the
Court decided that a corporation has a fundamental right to free speech
which can be abridged solely because the corporation is a corporation.
The insufficiency of this argument is demonstrated by the fact that
the Court had already rejected the same reasoning in Bellotti, in which
the Court stated that the mere fact that an entity is organized as a
corporation does not remove its speech from the protection of the First
Amendment. 3 The special advantages argument in Austin is an attempt
to get around Bellotti by acknowledging the precedent of a fundamental
right of a corporation to speak while at the same time claiming that
the very nature of the corporation itself permits the state to abridge
that right.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, many individuals and
entities receive "special advantages" from the state in the form of tax
breaks, contract awards, public employment and outright cash subsidies,5 '
yet the Court would not consider abridging their free speech rights on
this basis. Is the tax exempt status of church-owned property a "special
advantage" that contributes to the wealth of the Roman Catholic Church,
thereby justifying a ban on political speech by the Church?
As far back as 1958, in the case of Speiser v. Randall, the Court
held that the state cannot abridge a person's fundamental right merely
because he receives special advantages from the state." In Speiser the
Court ruled that California could not burden a war veteran's right of
free speech merely because the veteran received the "special advantage"
of a special veterans' tax deduction. In so holding, the Court struck
down a state law that would only allow the tax deduction to be claimed
by veterans who did not advocate the illegal overthrow of the United
States government. The Court determined that such a restriction, and
the placing of the burden of proof of nonadvocacy upon the taxpayer
rather than the state, unconstitutionally burdened the taxpayer's right
of free speech.
53. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1416
(1978). Also, id. at 784, 98 S. Ct. at 1420.
54. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958).
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In Pickering v. Board of Education, 6 the Court held that a school
teacher may not constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amend-
ment rights he would otherwise enjoy as a member of the community
to make critical public comments regarding the actions of the local
school board merely because he is employed by the board.517 The Court
ruled that the board wrongly denied the teacher his constitutional right
of free speech when it dismissed him for writing a letter to a local
newspaper stating that the school needed more money for educational
programs and should spend less on athletics.",
The most disturbing aspect of the Court's "special advantages" logic
is that the evil the Court seeks to eliminate is the prospect that the
special advantage-supported speech of the corporation may have an
influence on the public that is disproportionate to the popularity of the
corporation's ideas. Quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court
stated that '[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation
... are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas' and that "'[the availability of these resources may
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the
power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its
ideas."' 9 The Austin Court decided to take it upon itself to right this
"evil" by ruling that, at least in the case of corporations, the Court
itself can decide if a speaker is having too much influence on the election
process and can therefore be constitutionally silenced.
Calling the Court's reasoning "Orwellian," ° and characterizing the
majority's approach as "one man, one minute," 6 due to its potential
to allow the Court to determine how much speech a speaker is entitled
to, Justice Scalia noted that "the Court today endorses the principle
that too much speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe
... [T]hat principle is contrary to our case law and incompatible with
the absolutely central truth of the First Amendment: that government
cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of political
debate."62 Scalia quoted Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court specifically
rejected the notion of weighing the relative influence of speakers:
56. 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968).
57. Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734.
58. The text of the letter can be found in Pickering, id. at 575-78, 88 S. Ct. at
1738.40.
59. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258,
107 S. Ct. 616, 628 (1986).
60. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1408 (Scalia. J.,
dissenting).
61. Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest
in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation
on express advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates
imposed by [the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19711. But
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed "to secure the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation [to the public].''
The concept of justifying the censorship of political speech based
on the amount of popular support the speech commands is an extremely
dangerous notion for the Court to consider adopting. The First Amend-
ment is not designed to protect only speech that has "popular support."
In fact, such speech needs no protection, since it is highly unlikely that
speech that meets with the approval of the majority of the citizenry
will be censored. Rather, it is unpopular speech that is the primary
focus of the protective nurturing of the First Amendment. Presumably,
that includes speech by unpopular speakers. As Justice Scalia put it,
the First Amendment is not designed merely to protect popular ideas,
but to create a system "in which true ideas could become popular.""
The recent sweeping changes in the former Communist Bloc in Eastern
Europe have shown us the power of ideas that start in small groups
with little popular support and grow with time until they have freed a
nation. Would the U.S. Supreme Court have allowed the state to ban
the speech of the Solidarity trade union (if the union made the fatal
mistake of incorporating) because it began with only a few shipyard
workers in Gdansk and little popular support? Would the Court allow
the state to silence a minor third party candidate on the grounds that
he lacks the requisite public support to justify the protection of the
First Amendment? 6'
In upholding the Michigan statute in Austin, it is unlikely that the
Court truly intended to claim the ability to choose which speakers will
be permitted to engage in political speech. Nevertheless, Austin resulted
in the denial of a previously recognized right to free speech based on
63. Id. at 1411 (Scalia, J., dissenting, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49,
96 S. Ct. 612, 648-49 (1976) (citations omitted)).
64. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1415 (Scalia. J., dissenting).
65. The Court has already rejected this idea in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89
S. Ct. 5 (1968), in which the Court ruled that election officials cannot favor major
political parties to the detriment of minor parties. The plaintiffs were the rather odd
combination of George Wallace's American Independent Party and the Socialist Workers
Party, both of which were attempting to get on the ballot in Ohio, thus proving the old
adage that politics make strange bedfellows.
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the Court's sole weighing of the amount of influence the speaker could
have on its audience and introduced the prospect that the Court could
decide who had engaged in "too much speech.""6 The Court should
reconsider the idea that it is competent to weigh the popularity of speech
and deny a speaker the right to speak on that basis.
B. Analysis of "Corruption" Argument
As explained above, corruption of the political system has been the
only recognized compelling interest justifying a ban on corporate spend-
ing for political speech. The Austin Court cited no evidence whatsoever
of a link between corporate spending on political campaigns and cor-
ruption. Since the Court could not demonstrate how corporate inde-
pendent expenditures would lead to corruption as that term has been
heretofore defined, it reinvented the concept so that corporate expen-
ditures equal corruption, thereby preempting debate on the issue.
Stating that "In Buckley and Bellotti . . . we rejected the argument
that the expenditure of money to increase the quantity of speech some-
how fosters corruption," 6' Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, argued that
this new definition of corruption runs directly counter to the Court's
precedents. In a system set up to maximize the amount of information
available to the voters so that they may make the most informed choice
possible, it seems absurd to label as "corrupt" an attempt by anyone
to bring more information to the public. Kennedy goes on to explain
that the use of money in an election "may influence the outcome of
the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.""
In reaching its new definition of corruption the Court again at-
tempted to tie the right to engage in speech with the pre-demonstrated
public support for that speech, referring to the lack of "correlation"
between a corporation's capacity for speech and its public support.
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's approach involving calibrating
a corporation's right to speech with the level of popular support for
its stand amounts to an attempt to "restrict[ing] the quantity of speech
to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections," which he
contends is "antithetical to the First Amendment." 69
The majority's aim to prevent the corporation's speech from exerting
influence disproportionate to the ideas currently entertaining popular
support runs contrary to the Court's holding in Beilotti. The Bellotti
66. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1416.
67. Austin, .110 S. Ct. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1422 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, quoting First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1423 (1978)).
69. Austin, 10 S. Ct. at 1421 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Court, in upholding a corporation's right to make an independent ex-
penditure on behalf of a ballot issue, said:
[I]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is
the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a de-
mocracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from
a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union or individual. 0
The majority's line of reasoning here leads right back to the same
arguments the Court made in the "special advantages" section; the only
thing the court could find wrong with the corporation's speech is that
it is too influential. Justice Scalia sees the Court's real definition of
the New Corruption71 as "too much of one point of view." '72
Not only does the Court allow the banning of speech that can cause
the "New Corruption," the Court also takes pains to authorize the state
to restrict corporate speech that does not even meet its own definition
of corruption, because it is made by small corporations or non-profit
corporations who do not have the "immense aggregations of wealth"
that the Court finds likely to have "corrosive and distorting effects"
on elections. Not to worry; the Court declares that it is not corruption
that allows the state to restrict corporate speech, but the mere "potential
for such corruption that demands regulation."" The danger of permitting
the state to restrict any speech that it feels has the potential to be
harmful cannot be understated. "The Court," Justice Scalia stated in
his dissent, "thus holds, for the first time since Justice Holmes left the
bench, that a direct restriction upon speech is narrowly enough tailored
if it extends to speech that has the mere potential for producing social
harm. 17 4 Noting that the principle that a state cannot ban speech that
does not cause harm, but merely holds the potential to harm, dates
back to Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test", Scalia pointed
out that this ruling could alter previous first amendment rulings by
allowing the Court to convict individuals for selling books that have a
potentially harmful influence on minors,76 ban indecent telephone com-
70. BellottI, 435 U.S. at 777, 98 S. Ct. at 1416.
71. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
74. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).
76. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting, citing Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380, 77 S. Ct. 524 (1957). Note: the cases in footnotes 76-79 were cited by Justice
Scalia to show how their outcomes would change applying the Court's definition of the
"New Corruption."
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munications that have the potential of reaching minors," compel pub-
lication of membership lists of organizations that have the potential for
illegal activity,78 or compel an applicant for membership in the bar to
reveal his or her political beliefs and affiliations to eliminate the potential
for subversive behavior. 79 The specter of the government as arbiter of
what is "potentially harmful" speech is much more haunting than the
"specter" of a corporation getting more than its "fair share" of political
speech.
C. The Segregated Fund: Allowing Some Speech
As the law stands after Austin, the effects of the statute are aston-
ishingly broad. Not only would the statute have the effect of banning
"endorsement" advertisements like the one at issue in Austin, but,
Michigan conceded, the statute makes it a felony for non-profit cor-
porations like the Sierra Club, the ACLU, or the Chamber to print
voting records of incumbents to advise the public how its representatives
voted on issues of concern to its members and the general public.,* If
this activity is not protected by the First Amendment, what is?
The intended constitutional safeguard of the segregated fund system
(ostensibly allowing the corporation an avenue for some speech, so as
not to have the statute struck down as violative of the corporation's
First Amendment rights) fails entirely to protect the corporation's right
to free speech. The corporation has only the hollow privilege of lending
its name to the project, but not the capacity to use its own corporate
funds to get its message across to the public through the mass com-
munications media, the very essence of free speech in today's political
environment of expensive television and direct mail campaigns. 81 Clearly,
the "corporation's" speech loses its effectiveness if the corporation
cannot spend any of its funds to produce the speech, instead relying
on the relatively meager assets of the individuals it employs. It is doubtful
that these individuals can put up enough money for even a short tel-
evision blitz in a medium-sized market. Thus, their combined speech is
unlikely to be able to have any substantial impact on a state-wide
election. There is no comparison between the relative assets-and ad-
77. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 109 S. Ct. 2829
(1989).
78. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1173
(1958).
79. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting, citing Baird v. State Bar of
Arizona, 401 U.S. I, 91 S. Ct. 702 (1971)).
80. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 634-35 (1976) acknowledged
that mass communication requiring the expenditure of large amounts of money is "in-
dispensable" in today's electoral process.
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vertisement purchasing power-of a vice president of General Motors
and the corporation itself. If GM's speech is limited to what the vice
president can personally afford, the corporation will not be able to say
very much. It therefore appears that despite the Supreme Court's claim
that the Austin decision respects the corporation's fundamental right of
free speech, the Court upheld a statute that effectively prohibits such
speech from having any real effect.
D. Narrowly Tailored?
This brings us to the question of whether the Court's solution to
the "corruption" problem was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, as required by Buckley. 2
Assuming for the moment that some regulatory limitation on cor-
porate expenditures was justified due to the specter of corruption, the
Court's solution-allowing a ban on corporate expenditures and forcing
corporations to rely on segregated funds to which they cannot themselves
contribute-is not narrowly enough tailored to attack the problem.
In the first place, we have seen that the statute seeking to address
the problem of corporations which possess "immense aggregations of
wealth" acting to cause "corrosive and distorting effects" on elections
applies equally to small corporations or non-profit corporations which
have no capacity to cause such "corruption." The language of the
Michigan statute is clearly overinclusive, since it would serve to ban
expenditures by all corporations, not just those capable of creating the
distorting effect the Court seeks to prevent. A small corporation set up
to run a single sandwich shop, with virtually no capacity to distort the
political debate in even a small local race, would be subject to the same
spending ban as General Motors. Conversely, how is a $250 newspaper
advertisement more evil if it is placed by the incorporated Chamber of
Commerce than if it is placed by the candidate's next-door neighbor?
The solution is not "narrowly tailored" if it bans a $250 newspaper ad
that is incapable of causing the perceived "distortion" of the system.
As Justice Scalia put it, "fi]f narrow tailoring means anything, surely
it must mean that action taken to counter the effect of amassed 'war
chests' 3 must be targeted, if possible, at amassed 'war chests' and not
at small corporations that do not have the offending accumulations of
wealth, or small expenditures which do not, in fact, exhibit a distorting
effect on the electoral system.14
Secondly, despite the Court's assertion that the statute involves
merely a permissible limitation of the corporation's free speech rights
82. Id. at 44-45, 96 S. Ct. at 646-47.
83. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (use of the word "warchest").
84. Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and not a ban,8" we have seen that the "segregated fund" restriction
does in fact operate as a ban on corporate speech, since the corporation
is not permitted to contribute to the segregated fund nor to make its
own expenditures for political speech. 86
Even if the segregated fund system did not amount to a total ban
on corporate political spending, it would still be impermissibly burden-
some on corporate speech. Justice Kennedy pointed out that between
twenty-five and fifty percent of the money raised by a political action
committee like the segregated funds is required to "establish and ad-
minister the PAC," so the corporation would get less speech for its
money than if it spent the funds directly." Quoting Massachusetts Cit-
izens for Life, Justice Kennedy stated that the fact that the "avenue
left open is more burdensome than the one foreclosed is 'sufficient to
characterize [a statute] as an infringement on First Amendment activi-
ties.""'88 It is certainly more burdensome on a corporation's speech to
receive only one-half to one-fourth of the speech for its dollar that it
would have been able to make if it had engaged in the speech directly.
The. ban on political speech is impermissible if a lesser restriction
would suffice to solve the perceived problem. In the case of corporate
political spending, lesser restrictions such as a requirement that corporate
political spending be reported to the state election authorities, or a
reasonable limit on the amount of money a corporation could spend in
support of an individual candidate would be just as effective in pre-
venting the corporation from spending enough money to "distort" the
political debate without impinging on the corporation's free speech rights
any more than necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Austin, the Court claimed to continue to recognize the funda-
mental right of one type of speaker, a corporation, to engage in political
speech, but then allowed the right to be abrogated because the speaker
might get "too much speech." 9 The Court allowed the right to be
denied for such faint state interests that the "fundamental right" is but
an illusion that can disappear as soon as the corporation attempts to
exercise it. If the state can abrogate a right by combining two arguments
that had, taken individually, been rejected by the Court, what assurance
do any of us have that our fundamental rights will be respected?
85. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1398.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
87. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, quoting Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 255, 107 S. Ct. 616, 626 (1986)).
89. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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It is a very serious matter in a democracy to make publishing an
endorsement of a political candidate in a newspaper a felony. The right
to choose our leaders, and to have a voice in their election, is the
fundamental right upon which our nation is founded, the central tenet
of our democratic system. For the Supreme Court to abrogate that right
merely because it does not like the identity of the speaker is a very
grave signal that could conceivably lead to more "narrowly tailored"
solutions which ban the speech of other groups or individuals who do
not meet with the Court's approval. It should be the task of the people,
not the Court, to decide what speech will sway them. "The premise of
our system," Justice Scalia explained, "is that there is no such thing
as too much speech-that the people are not foolish, but intelligent,
and will separate the wheat from the chaff."'
In light of the tortured logic and great lengths to which the majority
went in order to justify upholding Michigan's ban on corporate political
speech, Justice Scalia observed that "[i]t is entirely obvious that the
object of the law we have approved today is not to prevent wrongdoing
but to prevent speech." 9 It is to be hoped that in the.next political
speech case the Court can fashion a new majority that will refrain from
infringing on the fundamental right of free political speech absent a
truly compelling state interest.
Michael Schofield
90. Id. at 1416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
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